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It is increasingly recognized in public administration that
the relationship between trust and transparency is not
straightforward. Recently, right-wing populists have risen
to power, rejecting transparency requirements based on
documents while claiming that they “hide nothing.”
Clearly, existing scholarly conceptualizations are insuffi-
cient for understanding how transparency operates as a
value in real-world political contestation. An analysis of
state- and national-level politics in Nigeria reveals that,
while always retaining a core informational component,
there are multiple competing conceptions of transparency.
Popular demands for transparency express a belief that not
only should data be made transparent, but also the social
networks in which politicians are embedded. “Transparency
in people” can clash with more traditional, technocratic
transparency practices centered on data. By rethinking who
or what should be made transparent—data, things, or
people—this article offers fresh theoretical insights on the
complex politics of transparency and trust.
1 | INTRODUCTION
In recent years the idea of transparency has become increasingly prominent in debates around governance
both in developed and developing countries. Transparency is promoted as a route to improving the
quality of government, with Transparency International's global ranking of national governments
according to their degree of openness. However, multiple studies have noted that empirically the
effect of transparency on governance is not straightforward, with greater transparency not always
leading to anticipated benefits. As Park and Blenkinsopp (2011, p. 271) note, “transparency might
have clear limits to its utility as a method for deterring corruption and improving citizen satisfaction.”
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Others have raised the possibility that the demands of transparency may impede efficient government
and democratic practice (Birkinshaw, 2006). Beyond the pragmatic and logistical trade-offs between
transparency and value for money or leaking of sensitive information (Heald, 2006), there remains the
unanswered question about whether greater transparency always correlates with or causes greater pub-
lic trust (Bauhr & Grimes, 2014). In some cases where transparency in data is in abundance, increasing
dissemination of documents—financial accounts, international codes and standards, audits—may in
fact obfuscate rather than clarify, heighten suspicion rather than soothe it. While transparency as a core
concept understood as “the citizenry's right to know” (Kaufmann & Bellver, 2005, p. 1) is salient
across diverse political contexts, the dominant interpretation of transparency as “the quantity and cov-
erage of budget information” (Renzio & Masud, 2011, p. 607) is only one conception of this core
concept.
Despite the proliferation of data, the rise of conspiracy theories claiming to illuminate the hidden
workings of power suggests that people find the activities of those in power less and less transparent
(Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). This debate has taken on heightened urgency in the context of rising
right-wing populism around the world: Despite advances in open government many regard their gov-
ernments as unknowable and believe their inner workings to be opaque and sinister. Reflecting on
Donald Trump's election to the U.S. presidency, Mark Fenster (2017) argues that the success of this
discourse derives from its ability to tap into unmet demands for transparency that go beyond tradi-
tional bureaucratic transparency. The fact that these antiestablishment figures can simultaneously
flout basic benchmarks of government oversight while claiming that they “hide nothing” speaks the
salience of two rival meanings of transparency. Technocratic transparency focuses on disclosing gov-
ernment information, whereas populist transparency holds that “the state must refrain from hiding
itself and the truth from the public” (Fenster, 2017, p. 173).
This article contributes to debates about the complex relationship between transparency and trust in
government. Rather than thinking of transparency as undifferentiated and monolithic, where more is
always better, this article draws on an emerging constructivist consensus where both anthropologists of
development and scholars of public administrations are increasingly recognizing that transparency and
its effects on trust are fluid, constructed, and context specific. Throughout this article, transparency is
taken to refer to the core informational concept of providing information about the rulers to the ruled.
Starting from a recognition that governments do not always offer the sort of transparency that citizens
actually desire (Cucciniello & Nasi, 2014), this article gives an empirically grounded theoretical
account of the plural conceptions of the core concept of transparency. Of course, discussions of trans-
parency inevitably stray beyond this core informational concept and implicate broader questions of
political legitimacy, the limits of bureaucratic power, and questions of formal and informal access to the
state. The nebulous nature of transparency is evident in its propensity to be “offered as a solution to all
manner of social, political, environmental and economic problems” (Birchall, 2011, p. 19). Thus, this
article uses transparency as the conceptual framework with which to explore the fluid and contested
nature of trust and legitimacy. Drawing on interviews and news reports gathered during a total of 6
months of in-depth qualitative fieldwork1 in Ibadan, Nigeria between 2013 and 2015, it sets out rival
conceptions of what aspects of government should be made transparent: data, things, or people.
Transparency in data corresponds to Fenster's category of technocratic transparency. However, it
gives a finer grained conceptualization of what he terms populist transparency, in a new but equally
globally significant context. Nigeria—Africa's biggest economy and most populous country—serves as
a valuable window to the potential and limits of transparency: Donor attention has long been focused
on governance reforms and there is a huge public appetite for tackling corruption (Smith, 2010). With
the rise of citizen-led online transparency platforms like BudgIT (see http://yourbudgit.com/), it would
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seem that any improvements in transparency in data should be welcomed with open arms. Yet in the
southwest, celebrated politicians who offer this donor-endorsed brand of good governance have been
voted from office or have had to radically change their policies in the face of popular resistance
(Roelofs, 2016). Just as in the United States with the rise of Trump, the Nigerian experience raises the
possibility that what scholars and donors mean by transparency does not connect with how it is under-
stood by voters.
This article looks at how those in power at the local, state, and national levels make sense of and
respond to demands for visibility and legibility, as well as cases where leaders are seen by their con-
stituents as failing to make themselves transparent. What emerges is that transparency is popularly
understood as a quality that can apply not only to data and documentary information but to things and
people. Of these, transparency in people represents the most significant departure from the good gov-
ernance agenda and yet motivates high-profile national level disputes that would otherwise remain
unintelligible.
The article proceeds by first comparing the development studies literature on transparency with
the more nuanced understanding offered by public administration. It sets out the debates over what
the goals of transparency should be and whether to think of transparency as revealing a representation
of reality, or as a construction in itself. Next, it contextualizes the state of transparency in data in
Nigeria and shows that despite the obvious need for improving government accounts, there is none-
theless evidence of a more generalizable ambivalence toward transparency and trust as noted else-
where. Section 4 presents case studies from national and subnational politics in Nigeria that show
how an alternative value of transparency in people shapes contestation. The conceptualization of
transparency in data, in things, and in people is presented. By highlighting the conflicting forms of
transparency, this conceptual framework helps account for popular suspicion of projects, relation-
ships, and people that, according to dominant approaches in development studies, exemplify good
governance. The conclusion unpacks the wider implications of the Nigerian case study for broader
theorizations of how transparency intersects with trust and populist politics.
2 | THEORIZING TRANSPARENCY AND TRUST IN DEVELOPED AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
This section brings together parallel literatures that typically explore transparency and trust but in
separate geographical and disciplinary areas: the literature on transparency in public administration in
predominantly developed countries, and the development studies literature on transparency as part of
good governance reforms in developing countries.
In developing country contexts, the study of transparency has been driven by the normative pol-
icy aims of the good governance agenda (Bank, 1992, p. 3), and its accompanying methods and con-
ceptual assumptions. Within this New Public Management–inspired development studies literature,
transparency is primarily seen as an instrument to accountability, amid a concern with corruption and
government ineffectiveness. Building on models of developing country governments that saw holders
of public office as inherently rent seeking (Krueger, 1974), transparency opens government activities
to public scrutiny, resulting in public pressure on governments to perform better and reduce corrup-
tion (Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Stiglitz, 1998). Thus, ordinary people need “easy access to information
on the workings of public programs intended for their benefit” to empower them to demand better
services and monitor officials (Reinikka & Svensson, 2003, p. 2).
Critical development studies has critiqued what the naïve assumptions of representational theories
of transparency promoted by the World Bank and others. Using constructivist methodologies,
ROELOFS 567
Hetherington (2011, p. 156) problematizes the representational conceptions of transparency that is
promoted by donors and the new wave of technocratic elites in Paraguay, which characterizes trans-
parency as the disclosure of “neutral” information. Through accounts, audits, and reports, citizens
gain knowledge of government actions, that is, the reality that is being represented. Indeed, this naïve
representational approach can be seen in work that has sought to make transparency applicable to
development. An example of this way of thinking is Fox's (2007) distinction between “clear” trans-
parency that “sheds light on institutional behavior” and directly facilitates action to improve gover-
nance, and “fuzzy” transparency where information is disseminated but “does not reveal how
institutions actually behave in practice” (p. 667). However, rather than clarity or fuzziness being a
quality of the information itself, it depends on who is reading it and how (Hull, 2003, pp. 288–289).
In trying to expunge information of fuzziness for one audience, transparency practices may create
“new opacities” (Christensen & Cheney, 2015, p. 70) for another. This suggests that rather than sim-
ply making information available the ultimate aim should be context-specific “legibility” (Fenster,
2006). Legibility is complicated by big data and “e-transparency,” with the need for secondary repre-
sentation of data via visualizations (Galloway, 2011) or its compilation into high-quality “machine-
readable” data sets on websites like Data.gov (Birchall, 2015).
Constructivist scholars highlight the unintended and differential effects of transparency practices.
How does transparency, with its shifting effects and constructed meanings, shape the relationship
between rulers and the ruled? Political anthropologists have explored the microlevel implications of
hegemonic transparency practices in an emerging “audit culture” (Shore & Wright, 2015) whereby
technologies of power aimed at transparency and accountability remake subjects and social relations
in new and constricting ways (Hull, 2012). Ethnographic insights hint at the political consequences
of privileging certain forms of transparency. In Paraguay, transparency practices empowered those
elites who were able to manipulate abstract documentary forms of information, but were contested
and subverted by the campesinos who experienced government data as yet another site of power rela-
tions (Hetherington, 2011). This literature, which encompasses the growing field of Critical Transpar-
ency Studies (Alloa & Thomä, 2018) and work on secrecy from cultural theory (Birchall, 2011),
provides vital contributions in deconstructing the idea of pure information and showing the unpre-
dictable, exclusionary consequences of pursuing such an idea. Moreover, it shows how transparency
practices have political consequences beyond the direct effects of the information released. By doing
transparency, organizations and individuals can accumulate “transparency capital” that can confer
both cultural and moral authority (Birchall, 2011, pp. 8–9). However, this literature has for the most
part existed in parallel to more practical discussions of how to best manage the dissemination of
information to meet citizens' demands for transparency. The literature on public administration, with
its primary focus on Western and developed nations, has long explored how the dissemination of
information about the workings of state power shapes the relationship between citizens and govern-
ment. Unlike the good governance literature that focuses on transparency as a means to accountability
and government effectiveness, scholars within public administration tend to regard legitimacy or trust
as the “main rationale” for transparency (Licht, Naurin, Esaiasson, & Gilljam, 2012, p. 111). Chang-
ing public attitudes to public works in a subdistrict of Seoul, for example, show that while more
transparency does not always reduce corruption, it still has benefits in terms of public trust (Park &
Blenkinsopp, 2011, pp. 271–272). Whether for citizens and government, or for employees of large
corporations, this literature builds on the intuition, often born out in reality, that “as organizations
become more transparent they will also become more trusted” (Rawlins, 2008, p. 16).
Whereas the good governance literature assumes that more transparency is always better, studies
within public administration have raised the possibility that transparency practices can have ambivalent
impacts on levels of trust (Bauhr & Grimes, 2014). Worthy (2010) notes that in the United Kingdom,
568 ROELOFS
ever more stringent transparency requirements have been accompanied by falling trust in institutions.
Fenster (2015, p. 150) has pointed to the way that increasingly onerous transparency requirements
breed a sense not of greater certainty but growing anxiety about whether data can be trusted. With ever
escalating auditing demands, more data are needed to verify existing data, and auditors themselves
must be audited: “The disclosure of state information consistently disappoints, however: there is never
enough of it.” Depending on cultural context and expectations of government capacity, greater trans-
parency may erode trust (Grimmelikhuijsen, Porumbescu, Hong, & Im, 2013). Scholars have specu-
lated as to the reasons for these counterintuitive cases of “more open but not more trusted” government
(Worthy, 2010, p. 561): Simply releasing information may spread confusion or alternatively beliefs
about government trustworthiness may be so deeply ingrained that they are only marginally influenced
by increased transparency (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2014).
There is a growing recognition of the nature of transparency as constructed and shifting. Review-
ing scholarly work on transparency within public administration over the last 25 years Cucciniello,
Porumbescu, and Grimmelikhuijsen (2017) point to a growing recognition that different forms of
transparency affect trust in different ways, but what those actual relationships are is less clear. Work
on transparency and trust should start from the “premise that the effects of transparency are very much
a product of the environment in which they are implemented” (Cucciniello et al., 2017, p. 41). Accom-
panying this shift toward seeing transparency as plural and unpredictable, constructivist thought has
gained prominence in debates about transparency and trust in traditionally positivist fields. Drawing
on Foucault and Baudrillard, Meijer has assimilated similar theoretically informed insights into public
administration. In his work on transparency in European public policy settings, Meijer (2013) shows
how the meaning given to transparency practices, and thus their effect on the relationship between
government and citizens, is constructed. What engenders trust in one administrative setting or one
policy area may raise suspicion in another, depending on whether it is framed as a naming and sham-
ing exercise or an invitation to public participation and collaboration.
Thus, the representational value of transparency must be distinguished from its symbolic power. At
times, as in the case of school rankings in the Netherlands (Meijer, 2009), the symbolic value of the
representation became more important than the thing being represented. The differential effects of trans-
parency may reflect the way its symbolic power can variously “reduce uncertainty” or “enhance ambi-
guity” (Meijer, 2009, p. 262). In fact, similar insights have been arrived at by scholars working within
radically different methodological frames. More quantitative work has highlighted that politicians
engage in transparency practices for the purposes of signaling their integrity. Just as constructivists
emphasize the slipperiness of transparency's symbolic value, in the language of rational actor models
Schnell (2017) shows how in Romania politicians may “miscalculate” the signaling effects of engaging
in transparency practices.
Inspired by the emerging consensus that “the effects of transparency are very much a product of
the environment in which they are implemented,” scholars from within the Western-focused public
administration literature called for research into the experiences of transparency in Africa and Latin
America (Schnell, 2017, pp. 41–42). Conversely, the debates over the ambivalence of transparency
in Europe have much to offer development studies. While scholars have asked questions like “Does
enhanced transparency, through the Internet, boost the legitimacy of the EU?” (Curtin & Meijer,
2006), such skepticism has rarely been asked with regard to good governance transparency reforms
in Africa. This is in spite of recent findings that transparency may impact trust in equally nonlinear
ways in African countries (Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, & Wibbels, 2018). This cross-fertilization is just
as important for development studies, which has remained largely untouched by conceptual debates
over transparency. If we accept that transparency can affect trust both positively and negatively, what
implications does this have to the goal of good governance? This article seeks to fill that gap. As
ROELOFS 569
shown in the empirical discussion later, the question of whether transparency inspires public trust is
not just how but what must be made transparent: data, yes, but also things and people.
3 | TRANSPARENCY IN DATA IN NIGERIA
Discussions of transparency in Nigeria, both within and without, tend to focus on the country's poor
record of corruption in government. Since the return to democracy in 1999, activists and scholars
have fought to strengthen mechanisms for tracking and publicizing government accounts. Gover-
nance reforms have been vital for recovering funds stolen by the previous military regime
(Enweremadu, 2013) as well as bringing the country into line with global standards of transparency
and accountability in order to receive debt relief and access to international finance (Thurston, 2018).
The well-publicized struggles of those seeking to improve transparency practices (Adebanwi, 2010)
and the widespread frustration at their failure (Smith, 2010) show that a lack of transparency has
harmed public trust in institutions. Indeed, in 2016 Nigeria ranked lowest in Africa for public trust in
the executive institutions of the state, with only 31% of Afrobarometer respondents saying they
trusted their government “somewhat” or “a lot.” Clearly, the need to improve the availability,
accuracy, and legibility of government accounts is an imperative, and it is on this area that donor-led
governance reforms have focused (see, e.g., the U.K. Department for International Development
funded State Accountability and Voice Initiative).
In the context of such low transparency and trust, it might seem that the debates in more developed
countries about technocratic or populist transparency are irrelevant. Yet the idea that developing coun-
tries, by virtue of their poverty or poor governance, sit outside the complex and messy world of politics
is to reproduce the depoliticizing, “antipolitics” effect of development interventions more generally
(Ferguson, 1990). In Nigeria, as in Europe and the United States, the relationship between transparency
and trust is ambivalent. Alongside campaigns for greater budgetary transparency and vocal demands
for stricter anticorruption laws, there is also a suspicion that official documents may be hiding as much
as they reveal. Of course, this is in part a consequence of low levels of trust in those who draft them,
but it goes beyond this to a skepticism of data as a form of communication in itself. Beyond the
straightforward barriers of illiteracy, idioms such as “talking grammar”—meaning pompous but non-
sensical talk—attest to the slipperiness of elevated forms of speech, and the ease with which words
can occlude and confuse rather than illuminate meaning.2 The idea of talking or speaking “grammar”
conveys the way in which jargon-laden forms of communication function to exclude people who do
not enjoy the level of participation required to decode it. Moreover, in the accusation that “your gram-
mar [is] too much” there is the suggestion that those with access to education and elite milieus might
use their way with words and apparent sophistication to mislead those who are excluded by it
(Demola, 2018).
In a preelection radio debate in Oyo state in the southwest, there was the same ambivalence
toward data as the sole source of transparency, this time in the form of skepticism toward a politician
who was seen to place too much emphasis on figures. A leading opposition candidate queried the
transparency of the governor's flagship flyover in Ibadan. “My brother” he said, referring to the gov-
ernor, “is very good at giving statistics.” His critique compared the statistical data about the flyover,
the N2.9bn cost, as well as its clearly discernible physical characteristics with those of a cheaper
flyover in Ogun state. He pointed out that the one in Ogun was also double lane, but longer and per-
mitted large trailers which were too heavy to use the one in Ibadan (“Governorship Debate,” 2015).
Many politicians rely instead on cultivating transparency and trust by pointing to visible tangible
outputs. As one state governor announced in 2016, the “State government is now in a better position to
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convince people to pay taxes because of its involvement in the execution of developmental projects,
especially physical ones which the tax payers can see” (Olaniyi, 2016). Whereas transparency in data
seeks to describe government action, and produce a representation of reality, transparency in things is a
direct apprehension of that action. Rather than information standing apart from reality as a representa-
tion (Hetherington, 2011), the reality is the information. It relies primarily on a visual logic, whereby
citizens can see what their government is doing directly. Seen through this lens, an itemization of gov-
ernment outputs in data acts merely as a signpost to the things that can be viewed directly. It empowers
the curious citizen to seek out the things on which government hangs its claim to transparency.
Overall, the status of technocratic transparency, where the focus is on data as a representation, is
mixed in Nigeria as it is elsewhere. The dire state of government accounts over history and ongoing
struggles with financial accountability motivate recurrent popular campaigns for more documents. In
the context of intermittent electricity supply and pay-per-byte mobile data plans, data come at a cost
and the imagined role of the citizen-auditor (Birchall, 2015) in scrutinizing data is especially burden-
some. At the same time, there are popular suspicions with whether representations and the language
used to communicate them can be trusted, leading to alternative but recognizable demands for trans-
parency made tangible. However, there have been high-profile political disputes centered on claims
about transparency that deviate significantly from either technocratic transparency or its more tangi-
ble variants.
4 | TRANSPARENCY IN PEOPLE IN NIGERIA
A focus on data would lead us to treat Birchall's concept of “transparency capital” as a close relation
of what scholars of Nigerian politics have called “technocratic capital” (Thurston, 2018, p. 217); in
fact, as this section will elaborate, discourses and practices of transparency have been utilized in ser-
vice of very different political projects and as a critique of technocratic politics.
4.1 | Untransparent relationships: The first lady's criticism
In October 2016 Aisha Buhari, the first lady of Nigeria, famously went against expectations of spousal
loyalty when she publicly denounced her husband, President Buhari, saying she would not vote for him
in the next election. In particular, she condemned his handling of official appointments (“Nigeria's
President Warned by First Lady Aisha Buhari,” 2016). She explained, “The president does not know
45 out of 50 of the people he appointed and I don't know them either, despite being his wife of
27 years.” In the context of complaints about nepotism, where appointments based on personal relation-
ships are feared as a source of corruption, the accusation that the president and his wife do not know
the successful candidates is puzzling. Yet Mrs. Buhari's comments were seen as reasonable and astute
by my informants.3
In this case, rather than transparency requiring that data or documents or accounts should be visible,
transparency is focused on the social information concerning leaders and their qualities. To be seen as
trustworthy and reliable, leaders should not hide: Their actions and connections should be visible. The
following examples demonstrate the salience of this conception of transparency in Nigerian political
contestation. The fear of unseen social networks controlling the state is observable in ongoing political
debates in Nigeria. The idea that “cabals,” small groups of unknown and unknowable individuals, are
controlling Nigerian politics from “behind the scenes,” is frequently alluded to. Commentators decry
what they see as the continued influence of a cabal of Northern “aristocrats” or military elites under
democratization (Uweru, 2010, p. 169).
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Albert (2012) provides the clearest theoretical exposition of the role of cabals in Nigerian politics.
He identifies them as a specific form of elite grouping where informal networks control formal politi-
cal processes. What is especially interesting about cabals is their unknowable character. Cabals “oper-
ate in the dark and hardly make any statements that could betray their identity.” This lack of visibility
makes them pernicious as they are “more difficult to manage than godfathers.” Albert distinguishes
cabals from other shady groupings like “mafias” and “godfathers” on the basis that whereas cabals
are unnameable and unidentified. Cabals, Albert argues, “consist of a shadowy group of people
bound together by some sinister political interests,” those who work with them are “unable to say
who they are” and those who expose their workings are still “careful enough not to name them.”
Knowability is linked to whether those in power can be “managed” or are beyond the reach of popu-
lar accountability. He quotes the Vice National Chairman of the Arewa Consultative Forum, a group
of Northern Governors, alleging in 2012 that “the leadership [of the nation] knows them and shields
them from being prosecuted” (Albert, 2012, pp. 2–4). The accusation of the existence of a cabal rep-
resents both the idea that there are unknown people behind the scenes, but that known individuals,
office holders, have connections to these unknown people that are being obscured.
Where transparency is understood as making known a politician's social affiliations, personal con-
nections, and political loyalties, then the appointment of candidates who by their anonymity are
“unknowable” in this way is in itself untransparent. Considering the salience of conspiratorial fears
about cabals, Aisha Buhari's concern makes sense: If the president himself does not know those in
his government, then by implication other, as yet hidden, forces are responsible for their appointment.
This means that those in office are imbricated in networks that are not transparent to voters.
Mrs. Buhari made this point when she claimed that those in top posts were there due to the influence
of “few people,” which echoes Albert's (2012) account of shady “cabals” dominating politics from
behind the scenes. In this way, theorizing transparency in people contributes to existing scholarly
concerns with unknowable and conspiratorial politics. It helps us make sense of otherwise counterin-
tuitive popular responses to government efforts at “good governance.” If these alternative forms of
transparency are not recognized, then even where transparency as data exists, citizens may still feel
that their leaders are untransparent and therefore fail to meet their conceptions of good governance.
The three conceptions of transparency are summarized in Table 1. The way that the same actions
and practices can meet one conception of transparency, while potentially eroding another, is the subject
of the next section.
5 | WHEN THE WRONG KIND OF TRANSPARENCY UNDERMINES TRUST
5.1 | Tinubu and conspiracy theories
What follows are two examples of transparency in data conflicting with transparency in people and thus
inspiring popular mistrust in recent subnational politics in Nigeria's southwest. From the mid-2000s Lagos
state government, led by Governor Bola Tinubu, was celebrated in the international press for moving from
the murky godfather politics seen to characterize Nigeria to embracing “good governance.” Behind this
TABLE 1 Three conceptions of transparency
Conception of transparency Substantive requirements
Transparency in data Availability of documentary information that is an accurate representation of government activities
Transparency in things Visibility of tangible developmental outputs
Transparency in people Legibility of social networks, connections, and obligations in which power holders are enmeshed
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praise is the assumption that godfathers are untransparent, whereas transparency improves as developing
country governments integrate themselves into international, donor-led best practice.
Whereas much scholarly and NGO commentary sees the power of godfathers as an obstacle to
transparent and accountable government (Human Rights Watch, 2007), this clashes with local evalua-
tions of Tinubu's role. After leaving office, Tinubu played the role of political “godfather” to aspiring
governors in other southwestern states. Abiola Ajimobi, in Oyo State, was one of his protégés.
Tinubu played a key role in Ajimobi's first campaign for the governorship in 2007, and his successful
bid in 2011 (Adebanwi, 2014, p. 223). Albert (2012, p. 2) defines godfathers as individuals who pro-
mote and control protégées through manipulation of a mass followership, but distinguishes them from
cabals because, crucially, they are publicly known. Indeed, my respondents on the street of Ibadan
were satisfied that they understood how Ajimobi and Tinubu were connected to each other through
ties of obligation and social networks. Many judged it uncontroversial, though not necessarily ideal,
that Tinubu's financial and political backing for Ajimobi's career came with strings attached. As one
journalist explained, “[h]e's not Santa Claus, he has to recoup his money.”4 In a context where show-
ing “appreciation” to one's patrons is a well-policed social norm,5 the relationship between Ajimobi
and Tinubu met the requirements of transparency in people.
However, Tinubu's influence represented for many a failure of transparency in people due to his
connections to the realms of international business and networks of prestige. For internationally edu-
cated elites in the upper echelons of the party and state government, Ajimobi's cooperation with
Tinubu was evidence of an enlightened orientation to development, where decisions were to be made
at the regional level and connections to international resources, knowledge, and people were to be
maximized. Tinubu embodied a 21st-century conception of the Yoruba notion of olaju or enlightened
development (Peel, 1978) through his engagement with modern private sector principles. In July
2013, Ajimobi and the ACN governor of Osun state appointed Tinubu to the position of chancellor at
LAUTECH, a university jointly controlled by both states. Ajimobi noted that Tinubu had “an interna-
tional network” that would help the school and he wanted LAUTECH to become a world-class insti-
tution (The Nation, 2013). Seen through the perspective of ordinary voters, Tinubu's outward-facing
connections take on a very different meaning. Tinubu maintained a presence in Ajimobi's policies in
various ways that raised suspicions about what the relationship to unknown third parties was, and
what obligations it placed Ajimobi under. Moreover, Tinubu himself represented connections to a
wider world of remote “international” connections that were unfathomable and beyond the horizons
of Oyo state. Knowledge of international professional norms and practices was seen as a source of
untransparency because through international exposure Tinubu knew how to be corrupt while looking
clean. People explained that what differentiated Tinubu from the likes of other famously patrimonial
godfathers was, as a journalist put it, “He's not to walk into the treasury and cart away funds.” Tinu-
bu's perceived adeptness at utilizing knowledge of international standards and systems—his success
in cultivating the new international capitalist form of olaju—enabled him to engage in one sort of
behavior while projecting an illusion of another.
As ubiquitous as the belief that Tinubu has merged state and personal interests, is the belief that
no one would ever be able to prove it. One source pointed to a lapsed investigation into a tax-
collection company in Lagos, “but there was no trail.”6 A senior journalist, working in the southwest
for a major national newspaper said that their investigations had shown that Tinubu had a hand in
government contracts but “on paper you will not find any trace … rather than employing impunities
like the People's Democratic Party (PDP) would do, they must design a clever way of approaching
some of these things.”7 According to this interpretation, a familiarity with international norms of
good governance, indeed the knowledge of how to conform to international standards of transpar-
ency, enabled Tinubu and others southwestern governors to engage in untransparent behavior.
ROELOFS 573
Commentators, political opponents, and gossip websites promote conspiracy theories that link
Tinubu's political domination of the southwest to his business “empire” (Okpi, 2014). Society-
NowNG.com (2011) claimed that any governor under his patronage must enter a “legal but intricate
business arrangement with the party leader's vehicle of commerce—directly or indirectly—to help
recoup expended resources and make gains.” Another article posted on Pointblank News and widely
reposted, specifically links those companies involved in Lagos public–private partnerships, such as
Alpha Beta Consulting and Lekki Concession Company, to Tinubu's status as “the emerging dictator
and emperor of the south west” (Nkordeh, 2012).
As discussed above in relation to cabals, the concept of transparency in people is often expressed
in idioms of a superficial surface impression obscuring a malevolent reality of unseen actors, connec-
tions, and loyalties. This same metaphorical structure can be seen in conspiracy theories about Bola
Tinubu. One article on Point Blank News contrasts “the rise of another seemingly righteous leader,
General Buhari”—that is, the benevolent surface image—with what it claims is the hidden real reason
for Buhari's rise, “criminal activity engaged in by one Mr. Bola Ahmed Tinubu” (Kayode, 2015).
While his connections to international networks are celebrated by his allies (as in the LAUTECH
example above), a common trope in conspiracy theories about him is that Tinubu's origins and iden-
tity are not transparent. Articles accuse him of using fake names (News of the People, 2012). This
implies that he engages in fraudulent behavior, but more importantly in the context of legitimate lead-
ership in Yorubaland, places him outside of a traceable ancestral lineage. Similarly, the accusation
that Tinubu oversees a conspiracy to use superficially legal companies to construct shady networks
replicates this structure of misleading and untransparent connections.
Some feared that Ajimobi's major infrastructure projects were being undertaken as a way of build-
ing up the economic base of his party, the All Progressive's Congress, with only secondary consider-
ation given to their actual benefits for development. A journalist articulated a sentiment that I had
heard alluded to numerous times in my research: “He [Tinubu] makes some contractors front for him
in state projects ... and that's why they [the APC governors] embarked on many of these projects.”8
The suggestion was that governors in the southwest undertook big infrastructure projects because they
created business opportunities for Tinubu's companies. A lawyer who worked with local business
elites complained that “APC central working committee is saying to all the southwestern governors,
you need to have contracts and give them to us, or give these companies contracts, so they can build
up some money.”9 The selection of contractors for state government projects in Oyo contravened the
value of transparency in people.
5.2 | Public–private partnerships, foreign contractors, and mistrust
The accusation that Ajimobi's government was hiring Lagos-based and foreign companies over Oyo-
based ones was a hot political topic throughout the governor's first term and into the election. Ajimobi
was keen to publicize his success at initiating investment deals with foreign countries, such as the pros-
pect of agriculture, trade, and investment with South Africa (“Oyo to Partner South Africa—Ajimobi,”
2015). Indeed, to overcome the problems of uncompleted projects, Ajimobi gave contracts to firms that
both had a good track record of performance elsewhere and substantial financial resources of their own,
so that they were not liable to delay the project should government funding be interrupted.
However, these criteria of having a track record and independent financial resources de facto
ruled out many local contracting firms that had less capital than competitors from Lagos or abroad
and had no claim to a world class track record. An example is the contracts given out for infrastruc-
ture and urban renewal. The state government strategically favored companies with better access to
finance, which in turn could have disadvantaged firms that did not have a national or regional reach.
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The case of Apete Bridge is an example of how the instability of government income with falling oil
revenues favored larger contractors with access to their own finance. In 2012, floods destroyed Apete
Bridge in Ibadan and the state government awarded the contract for the rebuilding to an “indigenous
company.” However, the original contractor lacked capacity for the complex engineering project, and
the project was passed on to another contractor. In press reports, the attorney general explained what
happened next. When revenue fell suddenly in the second half of 2014, the government “told the con-
tractor to seek fund for the project while we provide the collateral” (Atoyebi, 2014). By January
2015, the choice to partner only with companies who could afford to be paid 30% up front and the
rest on completion had effectively become state policy. Ajimobi referred to it as “financial engineer-
ing” and notes the “the local contractors cannot finance road projects” (Oderemi & Alao, 2015).10
The case study of the Oyo state government's announcement that they would build a light rail line
in Ibadan in 2015 reflects the hegemonic role of Chinese companies in infrastructure investment in
Nigeria (Lawal, 2015).11 Industry commentators note that there is a lack of capacity among Nigerian
firms to take on similar projects, not in terms of the actual construction and engineering but in terms
of the legal expertise needed to navigate the complex legal structures associated with PPPs (Dowden,
2013, p. 25). Therefore, transport and infrastructure PPPs represent a major area of state government
economic policy where forms of abstract knowledge serve as a barrier to the participation of local
firms in government contracts but also obscure the scrutiny of such, as they are beyond the compre-
hension of most local businesses. There was a belief that local companies keep the money in local cir-
culation, whereas foreign investors would take government money back home with them, something
some respondents termed “capital flight.” This frustration was tempered by an acceptance that the
benefits of a higher quality project could in theory outweigh the benefits of local contracting.12 None-
theless, local businesses felt that they were being locked out of government contracts, in favor of
companies who were beyond the horizon of Oyo state transparency or accountability.
Someone who had worked for a high-profile Ibadan political family, including on business deals,
explained his suspicion of Ajimobi's motives for partnering with Chinese companies:
If a local company is seen as corrupt, the EFCC might go after them. But, if Ajimobi has
done a corrupt dealing with a Chinese company, what are the EFCC going to do? They're
not going to understand it; they're not going to be able to go after them. It's going to be
difficult to discover what's going on, not to mention then trying to prosecute it.13
This section has explained the ways in which policies that embody transparency in data, and
appropriate auditing, come into conflict with popular conceptions of transparency in people. The gov-
ernor's relationship with his godfather Bola Tinubu in Lagos is shown to arouse suspicions by virtue
to its implication of unknowable global networks. Therefore, as the governor oriented himself toward
meeting internationally defined standards and working with foreign partners on key economic pro-
jects, he is seen as less transparent. Furthermore, there is a sense that Ajimobi and Tinubu have
access to unfamiliar international forms of knowledge, which they manipulate to achieve the docu-
mentary requirements of transparency in data. This leads to concerns that such abstract knowledge
can be used to obscure their social connections.
The popular suspicion of good governance reforms in Oyo state has wider implications for the
study of transparency, governance, and public trust more generally. Practices that aimed at transpar-
ency in data via improved government effectiveness and financial sustainability, in fact undermined
transparency in people. Together, these examples reveal that reforms aimed at mainstream concep-
tions of transparency may in fact lessen leaders' claims to transparency in the eyes of their
constituents.
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6 | CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF TRANSPARENCY IN PEOPLE IN
NIGERIA AND BEYOND
In conclusion, politics in Nigeria provides a window on the puzzle of why greater transparency does
not always lead to greater trust in government. Transparency is conceived of in multiple ways that at
times come into conflict, thus helping to explain why practices apparently improving transparency as
adherence to international best practice in certain political contexts lead instead to heightened suspicion.
Most of the literature of transparency and trust, whether in public administration or development stud-
ies, focuses on different mechanisms and procedures to achieve transparency in data: putting docu-
ments online, expanded budgetary openness, and escalating auditing requirements. However, political
contestation in Nigeria shows that these measures are insufficient to meet popular demands for a gov-
ernment that is knowable and visible. The social networks, relations, and obligations in which their
leaders are embedded are vital components of what it means to bring the business of power into the
open. Where data are provided in the absence of transparency in people, the existence of documents
and data may be perceived as an intentionally misleading surface image obscuring the public's access
to the real workings of power. The resulting levels of trust in government reflect the complex and con-
tradictory interplay of these different conceptions of transparency. Practices that strengthen the state's
grip on transparency in data may loosen its grips on other, equally important forms of transparency.
Thus we can see that transparency and trust should not be expected to relate to each other in a linear
way, because transparency itself is not linear but can be contradictory.
The conceptual distinction between transparency in data and in people makes a number of contribu-
tions to debates about the relationship between transparency and trust. First, the empirical material from
Oyo state confirms the constructed and contextual nature of transparency, in line with insights from crit-
ical anthropologists that are increasingly gaining traction in public administration. This highlights the
importance of assimilating these insights into the development studies good governance agenda. This
points to the insufficiency of representational understandings of transparency that simply demand that
“fuzzy” information to be made “clear” (Fox, 2007). Rather, it attests to the pitfalls of seeking to make
government power transparent: There can be no communication that is “devoid of mystery inaccuracy
and (mis)representation” (Christensen & Cheney, 2015, p. 70). Moreover, the insight that transparencies
will always create “new opacities” (Christensen & Cheney, 2015, p. 70) is borne out in the disquiet
around the role of Bola Tinubu and foreign contractors in Oyo state. By distinguishing between the
value of transparency in data and transparency in people, it is possible to detail why certain forms of
transparency create these “new opacities.”
The leveraging of alternative conceptions of transparency by antiestablishment figures across the
world demonstrates not only the conceptual but the political urgency of making sense of these new
and hitherto unrecognized opacities. This article builds on Fenster's distinction between technocratic
and populist transparency but differs from it in significant ways. Technocratic transparency largely
overlaps with what I term transparency in data. While transparency in people shares similarities with
populist transparency, it differs both conceptually and politically. Conceptually, populist transparency,
in Fenster's usage, refers to a whole package of moral and affective claims that emerge specifically
from the contemporary U.S. context. Transparency in people is defined more minimally as the value
of making social network, relationships, and obligations legible. It is simply the core imperative that
the government should be visible and knowable, but applied to the social relations of those in power.
The value of transparency in people is generalized through the political culture of Nigeria. Rather than
being wrapped up with an all-encompassing ideology as in the case of Trump's populist transparency,
it is better thought of as an accepted norm of political culture in Nigeria. It is not uniquely channeled
by populists: It is thus not a populist conception of transparency as much as a popular one.
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Fenster's category of populist transparency can be understood as both a rejection of transparency in
data and a desire for transparency in people. First, in its reliance on elevated forms of abstract commu-
nication, transparency in data is elitist insofar as these forms are seen as the reserved of the educated
elite. Whether in the fear that Tinubu will use Chinese business records to outsmart anticorruption
authorities, or that foreign companies are dominating business opportunities through mastery of legal
jargon, the failure of transparency in data to inspire trust results from the sense that the associated prac-
tices are slick but not honest. Those who are excluded from these cosmopolitan networks see elites
who appear to use their exposure to rig the game in their favor via “unethical if not technically illegal
means” (Fenster, 2017, p. 174). Moreover, the ability to work the gap between unethical but not illegal
was cast as resulting from their privileged access and exclusive control over to elite forms of transpar-
ency. In its extreme interpretations where transparency in data is seen as “talking grammar” writ large,
it might appear that the occluding power of these transparency practices is not an unintended conse-
quence, but their primary purpose.
Second, populist transparency relies on “notions of authenticity and honesty” (Fenster, 2017,
p. 173). Where Fenster identifies Trump's seemingly unmediated direct forms of speech and willing-
ness to be politically incorrect as signifiers of authenticity, transparency in people is the substantive
basis of these claims to authenticity and honesty. Voters, whether in Nigeria or elsewhere, want to
know who their leaders are, where they come from, and who they are connected to in order to trust
them. In its extreme incarnation, conspiracy theories reflect popular attempts to make social networks
legible in the absence of transparency in people. While this article has drawn from Nigerian case
studies, the core concepts have global resonance. The conceptual framework set out above helps
identify the failures of transparency that lead to the mistrust expressed in conspiracy theories and to
explain the success of politicians who promise an alternative vision of transparency.
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ENDNOTES
1For a description of methods, see the online Supporting Information.
2For an example, in his inaugural lecture at the University of Port Harcourt, Professor E. J. Alagoa described the risk of self-
important lecturers “talking ‘grammar’ and making little sense.” Such nonsense invites students to “return my ‘grammar’ in the
end-of-semester answer scripts” (Alagoa, 1979, p. 1).
3Focus group with academics and political activists, Lagos, June 22, 2018.
4Political journalist at a major national newspaper, Ibadan, July 25, 2015.
5For instance, much of the debate around the impeachment of a preceding Oyo State Governor, Rashidi Ladoja, in 2006 was
about the sins of “ingratitude” and how to negotiate political debts.
6Junior academic and political activist, Ibadan, January 5, 2015.
7Political journalist at a major national newspaper, Ibadan, July 25, 2015.
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8Political journalist at a major national newspaper, Ibadan, July 25, 2015.
9Director of Ibadan-based legal practice, Ibadan, May 21, 2015.
10This was confirmed through interviews. Local investors who pitched projects to the governor were unable to fund the project
themselves and faced interest rates of over 25% when they approached banks for funding.
11The biggest single investor is the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC), which has been announced
as the partner for Ibadan’s forthcoming light rail system. CCECC is building a similar light rail line in Lagos. By 2015,
CCECC, or its parent company the Chinese Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC), had been awarded contracts for a fur-
ther seven major railway lines across Nigeria.
12Director of Ibadan-based legal practice, Ibadan, May 21, 2015.
13Former aide to major Ibadan political family, Ibadan, May 15, 2015.
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